We analyze a game with N farmers that extract groundwater from a common aquifer of small storage capacity. Our aim is to compare the socially optimal, myopic and feedback extraction strategies, the latter arising from competitive interaction between extracting agents. Our extension to existing literature is that we consider heterogeneous farmers, facing uncertainty deriving from stochastic rainfall. The farmers di¤er in terms of their choice of irrigation technology, which results in di¤erent farmer-speci…c impact on the aquifer recharge rate. We illustrate the implications of the di¤erent strate-1 2 gies on extraction rates, groundwater table levels and welfare attained, via simulations based on data from the Kiti aquifer in Cyprus.
more noticeable. Dixon (1989) , Negri (1989) , and Provencher and Burt (1993) model uncontrolled strategic interaction (feedback solution) under the common property arrangement. In these models farmers'behavior is "memoryless" in the sense that each farmer's pumping behavior depends only on the current state of nature, and farmers take the state-dependent extraction rules 1 of their rivals as given. The empirical results from this literature indicate that the steady-state groundwater reserves attained when farms use feedback strategies are bounded from below by the steady-state arising when farms are myopic and from above by the steady-state arising from optimal exploitation.
Although there exist groundwater studies that take rainfall stochasticity into account (Burt, 1964 (Burt, , 1967 (Burt, , 1970 Provencher and Burt, 1994 ; Olson, 1995, Fisher and Rubio, 1997; Zeitouni, 2004) , non of them is solved in a game theoretic framework. What's more, none of these studies consider heterogeneous farmers. In our paper we consider a model that accommodates both strategic interaction between extracting agents and stochastic aquifer recharge, where recharge's stochasticity derives from stochastic rainfall. Each farmer makes his/her extraction choice facing uncertainty due to stochastic rainfall. Moreover, we consider heterogeneous farmers with respect to their choice of irrigation technology, which results in di¤erent farmer-speci…c impact on the aquifer recharge rate. The more e¢ cient the chosen irrigation technology the smaller the return ‡ow of water in the aquifer, but it is also true that the more e¢ cient the farmer the less water he will extract from the aquifer for irrigation purposes.
The objective of this study is to compare the socially optimal extraction strat-egy with the feedback extraction solution and the myopic solution, when farmers are heterogeneous and interact under uncertainty deriving from stochastic rainfall.
We illustrate the implications of the di¤erent strategies on extraction rates, groundwater table levels and attained welfare, via simulations based on data from the Kiti aquifer in Cyprus, which is an aquifer of small storage capacity. The results support Koundouri's (2000) …nding that the Gisser-Sanchez result does not apply to small aquifers: our results indicate signi…cant di¤erences between the solutions arising from competition versus optimal extraction.
The chapter is structures as follows: In section 1 we develop the model of groundwater extraction with heterogeneous agents under stochastic recharge and solve the non-cooperative and social planner problems. In section 2 we apply both of these solutions, via simulation, on data from the Kiti aquifer in Cyprus and discuss the results. Section 3 concludes the paper.
Groundwater extraction under non-cooperation
We …rst examine non-cooperative extraction of groundwater, where each farmer makes her extraction decision without considering its e¤ect on the other farmers' expected payo¤s. There are no negotiations or understandings between the farmers.
Each farmer maximizes her expected payo¤, taking as given the other farmers'rates of extraction, which she can only infer from her knowledge of the other farmers' objective functions. Consider an aquifer where only the N farms with land overlying the aquifer have access to the resource. The farmers di¤er in terms of their choice of irrigation technology. By assumption, the farmers can be divided into two groups according to their e¢ ciency and hence their e¤ect on aquifer recharge rate: e¢ cient farmers and ine¢ cient farmers. Within each group, farms are identical in the sense that the pro…t function (q j;t ) representing the bene…ts from groundwater extraction and the recharge rate k are identical for all the N k , k = e; i, farmers in the group.
The term q j;t denotes groundwater extraction by farmer j in period t, and the subscript k = e; i refers to e¢ cient and ine¢ cient farmers. The per unit cost of groundwater pumping is determined by the level of the water table in period t, h t .
The costs of groundwater extraction, c(h t ), then are identical for all the N farms.
Farmer j0s (j = 1; :::; N ) net revenue from water consumption is:
By the assumption of farmers within each group being identical, the N k farms in each group will pump the same amount of groundwater in period t;denoted by q 
where e R t denotes periodic rainfall, A the area of the aquifer, S the storativity coe¢ cient, and a k , k = e; i the recharge rate. The annual rainfall is a random variable. By assumption, the farmers' planning horizon is in…nite. The discount factor used to trade o¤ current and future net bene…ts is , where 0 < < 1:
There are two hypotheses we might entertain about the farms'decision problem when the aquifer is common property. If the agents are myopic, they do not consider the e¤ect of their extraction on the groundwater stock. Each farm sets its extraction rate so as to balance the marginal net bene…t of groundwater extraction and the unit cost of extraction:
When the number of extracting agents is relatively small, a more realistic description of pumping behavior would be that each agent considers the e¤ect of its actions on the groundwater stock, but takes the other agents extraction plans as given. An individual agent's perception of the stock equation is:
when agent j is of the e¢ cient type, and
when agent j is ine¢ cient.
The individual agent's problem then is to:
subject to the state equation (4a)/(4b). The dynamic programming equation for the agent's problem is:
The …rst-order necessary condition to the problem on the right side of (6) is:
Benveniste and Scheinkman's formula (1979) implies that
since @g=@h = 1. Equations (7) and (8) 
Social planner' s solution
We next turn to the problem of central (optimal) control. Consider the case where there exists a single manager with the authority to control each …rm's rate of extraction. The social planner's problem is to maximize the aggregate net bene…t of groundwater extraction:
subject to the state equation:
There are N e e¢ cient agents and N i ine¢ cient agents among a total of N agents.
Assuming that the social planner weighs each farmer's net bene…ts equally, the dynamic programming equation for the social planner's problem can be written as:
The …rst-order conditions are:
for k = e; i. Dividing by N k yields:
Equation (13) together with the associated Benveniste and Scheinkman formula determines the socially optimal rates of extraction q k for k = e; i given the water (7) and (13) shows that the individually optimal rate of groundwater pumping exceeds the socially optimal rate.
Application of the model
The application of the model uses data from the Kiti agricultural region, an aquifer with small storage capacity located in the coastal southern part of the semi-arid island of Cyprus. The notion of common property characterizes ownership of groundwater reserves, as the doctrine of absolute land ownership governs property law in the island. In particular, although the doctrine conditions ownership of groundwater on ownership of land overlying the aquifer (thereby limiting access), in all other respects owners of land own groundwater as a common property resource subject to the rule of capture. Royston (1991) in order to identify the distribution from which our sample is coming from. This test indicates that at 98% con…dence level we cannot reject the hypothesis that rainfall follows a gamma distribution. The discussion in the previous paragraph indicates that 85% of the farmers in the area are e¢ cient, while 15% of them are ine¢ cient. The total number of farmers is 60. With regards to the groundwater demand curve we use the one estimated by Koundouri and Christou (2000) . Given the absence of observations over a wide range of prices, the derived demand for groundwater by farmers was estimated by linear programming. From this demand curve we derive the individual farmer's demand curve and calculate the bene…t function for each farmer. The marginal cost function used in the solution of the system is
The Data
The di¤erence (SL h) measures pumping lift, the distance from the water table to the irrigation surface. This pumping cost function (a speci…c form of a general cost function) is very popular in the literature; e.g. Gisser and Mercado (1973) , Kim et al. (1989) . Its derivatives have the desirable properties: a positive partial derivative with respect to (q) and a negative cross-partial derivative between (q) and water table.
Simulation results
Simulations were carried out in Matlab 6.0 using the CompEcon Toolbox for Matlab In parallel to previous studies, the results indicate that a social planner would conserve the resource more than the status quo. Under optimal extraction, the mean elevation of the water table will approach 41 m, as opposed to the current level of Under socially optimal extraction the expected welfare would be close to tenfold compared to the competitive outcome while the groundwater resource would be reserved. Compared to competitive extraction, the socially optimal solution allocates substantially more water to the ine¢ cient relative to the e¢ cient agents. Given that our results indicate signi…cant di¤erences between the solutions arising from competition versus optimal extraction, an interesting extension would be to investigate economic instruments that can be prescribed as remedies for the ine¢ ciencies arising in the feedback solution. The remedy usually prescribed by the economics literature for the ine¢ ciencies arising in common property groundwater extraction is central (optimal) control by a regulator, who uses taxes or quotas to obtain the e¢ cient allocation of resource over time. Another instrument considered to implement the full cooperative outcome is a tradable permit scheme. In the context of groundwater depletion Provencher (1993) and Provencher and Burt (1994) examined the applicability of the tradable permit scheme in which private shares to the groundwater stock are established. In their framework, farms are granted an endowment of tradeable permits to the in situ groundwater stock, which they control over time. Each farm's bundle of permits represents its private stock of groundwater.
This private stock declines due to groundwater pumping and increases to re ‡ect the farm's share of periodic recharge. It also changes in response to the farm's activity in the market for groundwater stock permits, increasing when permits are purchased and decreasing when permits are sold. As a practical matter, the market price for permits serves to allocate groundwater over time. 
